IP data sources and limitations

The providers and standards behind public address observations, DNS results, registration records and local calculations.

Last updated: 2026-10-16

IP data sources answer different questions

Sources are not interchangeable. A request observation tells us which address reached an endpoint. A regional registry describes network registration. A DNS resolver answers a naming question. A geolocation database estimates a location using its own methods. This page identifies the IP data sources used by the current tools and explains why a field from one category should not silently be treated as evidence from another.

The practical rule is to keep the source close to the result. A current address should show where it was observed. A DNS response should name its resolver. A registration result should link to the registry record. Sources can have different update schedules, access conditions, coverage, and failure modes. Naming them helps a reader decide whether the result is suitable for a support request or operational decision.

Sources from direct and edge requests

The homepage can obtain the visitor's source address from trusted request context in a supported deployment. Cloudflare's request metadata can also contain approximate country, region, city, timezone, and network organization information. These IP data sources belong to the request being handled. Their availability depends on the deployment and request, so missing metadata is not replaced with guessed values from the application's own server location.

Cloudflare documents its relevant headers in the HTTP headers reference and request properties in the Workers request documentation. Sources carried in headers still require a trust boundary. An arbitrary visitor can send a header with a familiar name to an ordinary server, so the application must establish that trusted infrastructure supplied it before treating it as evidence.

The address observation and location metadata have different meanings. The connection source can be directly observed at an endpoint, while a city field remains a location estimate. Sources should not be given one blanket accuracy label when they describe different facts. A VPN exit, mobile gateway, or business network can also make the observed network location differ from the device's physical position.

Map display and IP data sources

The homepage map uses approximate latitude and longitude from the trusted Cloudflare request, or an IPWhois lookup of the same displayed public IP when edge coordinates are missing. These sources are never replaced by GPS coordinates or the backend server's location. Invalid, incomplete or untrusted coordinates produce a clearly labeled world overview without a visitor pin. The browser renders the map with MapLibre and loads geographic tiles, fonts and icons from OpenFreeMap. A locally versioned Liberty-derived style follows our light and dark themes. OpenMapTiles and OpenStreetMap attribution remains visible; style credits and licenses describe the adaptation. OpenFreeMap currently permits free commercial use without an account or key, but does not guarantee perpetual availability. Its data remains OpenStreetMap-derived. The browser sends its network address and requested map area to the map provider. The provider's privacy policy explains normal logging and temporary security logs. Coordinates outside the map projection's supported latitude range use an unpinned overview. These sources and map imagery serve different purposes: tiles draw geography; they do not verify the location estimate. A failed map does not remove the IP result.

IPWhois location and network details

The homepage automatically requests the displayed public IP's details from IPWhois through our server. The response supplies approximate country, region, city, coordinates, time zone, ASN, ASN organization and ISP. We verify that the response belongs to the requested IP. Trusted edge coordinates take priority; the fallback supplies a single coherent location when those coordinates are absent. ASN organization and ISP are separate fields, and providers can disagree.

This uses the keyless free endpoint, subject to its quota and availability. Successful results are cached for ten minutes in bounded server memory; failures leave fields unavailable. Proxy and threat catalog checks are available as separate tools, described below.

ipify as one of the IP data sources

The browser fallback uses ipify's documented public address API. The IPv4 test uses api.ipify.org, the IPv6 test uses api6.ipify.org, and a general fallback can use api64.ipify.org. These sources observe the source address of requests sent from the browser. The site labels that provider rather than presenting the result as a direct observation by its own server.

A request to an external address endpoint necessarily discloses a source address to that endpoint. Browser requests omit credentials and do not send the site's page URL as a referrer. The provider's own policies still govern its operation. Sources can also be blocked or temporarily unavailable. A failed endpoint request is reported as a failed check, not as a made-up address or a guarantee that a particular protocol is disabled.

Browser and STUN IP data sources

The WebRTC leak test uses browser-reported ICE candidates and Cloudflare's public STUN endpoint, stun.cloudflare.com:3478. These sources are contacted only when the visitor starts this test. Cloudflare observes the source of the STUN traffic; separate ipify requests provide HTTP references for each address family.

Candidate reports stay in the current tab unless copied. Sources can expose public, private or mDNS candidate values under the browser's policy, so a copied report should be reviewed before sharing. No camera permission, microphone permission or remote peer is used. These IP data sources do not establish the route of every application, and incomplete gathering is not interpreted as a privacy success.

Destination comparison sources

The IP comparison uses direct browser requests to the site's public address endpoint, ipify, and Cloudflare's trace endpoint. These sources receive separate requests to the URLs displayed in the tool. Cloudflare trace contributes its reported address field; unrelated fields are discarded. Additional regional nodes, when configured, must provide direct observations and carry an operator-declared destination label. The default IP data sources do not establish a mainland China versus fixed overseas comparison or the address seen by Google. Same-version results are compared, with missing responses and partial coverage kept visible.

Remote measurement sources

The ping test and online traceroute use Globalping probes. These sources observe remote paths to a submitted public target. We show the actual probe location and network, selected protocol, timestamp, and public source response. A hostname is resolved through Google Public DNS before one validated public address is sent to the probe. These IP data sources do not measure the visitor's own route or application response time. Targets and results are public at the provider and may remain available for up to six months. Stopping collection or clearing our display does not cancel or delete an upstream measurement. Missing replies and provider failures remain distinguishable from a proven target outage.

TCP connection sources

The HTTP headers check uses the same public Globalping sources for bounded HEAD requests and redirects. Each destination is validated and pinned separately; the original hostname supplies Host and SNI. Actual response fields, truncation and probe TLS authorization remain separate evidence. These IP data sources may return headers from an unverified TLS connection; we display that condition and stop the chain.

The port checker uses the site server's own TCP socket outcome. These sources distinguish connection establishment, refusal, timeout, unreachable conditions and runtime restrictions. One public target is tested per submission, using a single port or a fixed preset of four or six ports without application data. Hostnames use Google Public DNS before the selected address is pinned. The optional browser-address control uses ipify only to fill the target. These sources do not identify the application's health, the probe's geographical location, or UDP behavior. No public Globalping measurement is created by this tool. The destination may log the connection, and other IP data sources or network observers may retain their own records even after the local result is cleared.

DNS answers among the sources

DNS and reverse DNS tools use the Google Public DNS JSON-over-HTTPS interface. Queries go through the site server with the selected name and record type. The response can include answer records, authority records, TTLs, response codes, and DNSSEC-related flags. These sources describe the remote resolver's view, not the cache or DNS configuration of every visitor's device.

The tool requests an empty EDNS client subnet to avoid forwarding a client network prefix for geographic answer selection. That setting does not make the query invisible to the resolver: the requested name is still required to answer it. IP data sources should be chosen with the sensitivity of the input in mind. Avoid submitting private internal names unless you understand the disclosure and the limitations of a public resolver.

A PTR result can name an address without listing all hosted websites. An A or AAAA result can identify a published destination without proving that its application is healthy. Sources from DNS should be interpreted using the record type and response code. NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, and SERVFAIL represent different outcomes, and an absent authenticated-data flag is not a general declaration that a site is unsafe.

Registry sources: IANA and regional registries

Registration lookups use IANA's IPv4 RDAP bootstrap directory and IPv6 RDAP bootstrap directory to find the responsible service. The supported regional registry hosts belong to ARIN, RIPE NCC, APNIC, LACNIC, and AFRINIC. These IP data sources are used for internet number registration, and the returned source URL is visible with the result.

The tool displays selected network fields rather than every nested contact object. Depending on the record, available fields may include a name, handle, range, type, and registration country. Sources in registries describe allocations and assignments under their policies. They do not necessarily identify the retail provider's brand, the current individual user, or the physical location of an endpoint. Shared addresses and intermediary providers make those limits especially important.

Registry services can return errors, referrals, or incomplete information. The implementation follows only supported secure registry destinations and limits response size and request duration. Sources outside that supported path are not silently fetched through arbitrary URLs. If a referral cannot be followed, the interface reports the limitation. A failed query is not evidence that a public address has no legitimate allocation.

Domain registration alongside IP data sources

The domain WHOIS lookup uses the separate IANA domain RDAP directory. These registration services complement sources but describe domain objects, not address allocations. One exact name is sent to the selected HTTPS registry endpoint from our server. The summary includes returned registrar entities, events, statuses, nameservers, DNSSEC declarations and privacy notices. Registrar referral links are shown without automatically requesting them. Unsupported suffixes, access restrictions, rate limits and RDAP 404 responses stay distinct. Missing domain records do not establish availability. As with other sources, the provider URL and retrieval time remain visible.

Routing IP data sources from RIPEstat

The ASN lookup uses RIPEstat's Network Info and AS Overview endpoints. An IP query returns a matching prefix and observed origin numbers; an ASN query returns a holder description and origin visibility under the source's threshold. These sources are collected routing and registry evidence. They do not directly test packet delivery or identify the subscriber who used an address.

Network Info uses eight-hour data dumps, while overview responses can include a source query window. These sources are therefore labeled separately from the time this site receives a response. Every returned origin is preserved. Special-use ASN ranges are classified without a RIPEstat query, and a negative origin status is not described as an outage because transit-only networks can also have that status.

Standards as IP data sources for local arithmetic

The subnet calculator does not need a live provider response. It applies address arithmetic locally in the browser using the supplied address and prefix. Its supporting sources are standards and address definitions rather than a remote database of active devices. RFC 4632 describes CIDR, RFC 3021 covers IPv4 point-to-point /31 use, and RFC 6164 discusses IPv6 inter-router /127 prefixes.

Address handling also relies on published special-use definitions and normalized text conventions. RFC 1918 defines private IPv4 space, RFC 6598 defines shared address space, and RFC 5952 specifies a recommended IPv6 representation. These sources help interpret the input, but they do not reveal who occupies a private address in a particular local network.

Missing fields in IP data sources

The site does not currently substitute a registry country for an arbitrary address's city-level geolocation. It does not manufacture a VPN label, abuse reputation score, or exact location from a network name. Additional sources would need appropriate access rights, definitions, update behavior, and visible limitations before those fields could be supported. A blank field is more honest than an unsupported inference presented as a measurement.

Original research also requires reproducible observations. Provider disagreement studies, browser privacy matrices, and performance comparisons cannot be created merely by combining plausible text with source links. Sources must actually support the measurements claimed. The site should distinguish a methodology for a future study from results that have already been collected, and disclose the sample and environment when presenting original findings.

Comparing results and reporting discrepancies

When IP data sources disagree, compare equivalent fields for the same address and time. A registered country, a geolocation estimate, a DNS hostname, and the user's physical location are four different concepts. Record the provider and update or observation time where available. If the disagreement affects a service, ask which provider and field that service actually uses before requesting a correction from an unrelated source.

For a reproducible report, include the tool, query, response code, relevant values, source URL, and observation time. Keep unnecessary personal information out of public reports. Sources are useful when their scope is understood and their limitations remain visible. The methodology explains how these sources are turned into individual checks, and each tool guide describes the most common mistakes when interpreting its results.

HTTP measurement endpoints as sources

The speed tool embeds OpenSpeedTest’s official hosted widget. These IP data sources are contacted directly by the browser: loading the panel requests the provider’s interface and supporting resources, and pressing Start initiates the bandwidth test. The provider’s servers receive the browser’s public address and ordinary request information.

These sources describe the path from the browser to OpenSpeedTest’s measurement servers. OpenSpeedTest supplies the interface, server selection and download, upload, ping and jitter results. This site does not recalculate or import the widget’s results into its own database. The provider controls its own processing and retention; we do not promise that requests or results stay only in browser memory. This integration does not establish universal internet capacity, ICMP latency or UDP packet loss.

The mail-list sources are SpamCop and PSBL, queried through Google Public DNS with per-run source controls. These IP data sources supply narrow mail-list evidence, not subscriber identities or universal safety ratings. The blacklist check names both integrations, preserves failures and does not query IPv6. DNS cache lifetimes do not establish listing age.

For hostname lookup, Google Public DNS supplies three separate DNS observations. These sources are queried with checking enabled and empty EDNS client subnet; the browser does not independently validate signatures. CDN hints compare observed alias targets with documented CloudFront, Fastly and Akamai suffixes. Such sources do not provide a complete CDN inventory or an origin-server identity.

The CIDR calculator also works locally, covering inclusive ranges, aggregating networks and splitting prefixes. It needs no live IP data sources. It preserves the mathematical family of mapped IPv6 inputs and displays exact totals; paginated splits do not enumerate every address. External sources cannot turn those calculations into evidence of allocation or permission.

The email header analyzer uses pasted header text as its only evidence. These local sources are unverified user-supplied records. Parsing runs in the tab without DNS, registry or location requests; authentication assertions are not independently checked. Such IP data sources cannot establish a sender's identity or physical location.

The password generator and PIN generator use browser Web Crypto as their random source. They need no external sources, account identifiers or existing passwords. Rejection sampling avoids character-selection bias; generated strings remain local until explicitly copied. Sources cannot certify the receiving account's protections or register these candidate strings as credentials.

Shared diagnostic limits

The TCP and Globalping tools coordinate their allowances through Cloudflare Durable Objects. These operational counters are not IP data sources and do not add evidence about a target. Request and attempt budgets apply across serving instances; HTTP redirect probes count as new attempts. A denied allowance or unavailable coordinator stops new diagnostic work instead of fabricating a network result. These sources remain labeled separately from errors about our own service capacity. Shared connection addresses can share a visitor allowance. The privacy policy describes keyed counter identifiers, expiry and cleanup.

Browser signal observations

The browser fingerprint tool reads local APIs. These fields describe the current browser context, not an address registry or verified hardware inventory. Collection starts after a click; the optional fixed Canvas sample uses raw RGBA pixels and SHA-256, while WebGL exposes separately labelled standard and debug properties. Browser-reported fields may be reduced, blocked or randomized. The report stays in the tab, with no external fingerprint provider or comparison population. Sources for public address observations remain separate.

Local address fixtures

The random IP address generator combines browser Web Crypto with a versioned range policy derived from IANA registries and the documentation/private-address RFCs. These sources define eligible intervals, not current routes or ownership. No external IP data sources are queried during generation; public candidates exclude complete special-purpose blocks and may still be unallocated or unreachable. The result shows the policy review date and exact eligible count.

Credential pattern model

The password strength checker uses zxcvbn-ts 4.2.0, common dictionaries 4.1.3 and English dictionaries 4.1.1. Unlike remote lookups, these model assets load from this site only after a check is requested and evaluate the candidate in a browser worker. They are model dictionaries, not live breach or account records. The dictionaries cannot confirm credential uniqueness or security; no hash-prefix lookup is performed by this tool.

The estimator software uses the MIT license. The English package also includes a processed OpenSubtitles/OPUS dictionary under ODC-BY; its supplied attribution is preserved in our model license notices. These model assets are versioned with the tool rather than updated silently during a check.

Telephone numbering metadata

The phone number lookup uses libphonenumber-js 1.13.14 and its complete maximum metadata. These local sources derive telephone numbering rules from the upstream libphonenumber project and load after an explicit lookup. They describe possible lengths, digit patterns, formats and types. They are not subscriber records or live carrier intelligence. Software and derived-data notices are retained in the model licenses; sources for actual network observations remain separate.

Sources selected for a combined review

The privacy scan reuses the named IP data sources above: this site's address endpoint, ipify, Cloudflare STUN, local browser APIs, Google Public DNS, SpamCop SCBL, PSBL and the server TCP probe. It contacts only selected sources after submission. Sources for the browser and an entered target have distinct scopes; the interface preserves that difference. Optional graphics inspection stays local, and TCP requires a separate permission confirmation. No new classification database or population fingerprint service is added. These sources do not cover DNS observer exposure, proxy classification, remote geolocation, breach exposure or certificate chains in this combined report.

Public network classification lists

The proxy checker uses separately named IP data sources: X4B VPN ranges, X4B datacenter/VPN ranges, monosans public-proxy endpoint and exit observations, and Tor Onionoo IPv4 exit observations. These sources describe different evidence and do not establish current use or abusive behavior. GitHub downloads are pinned to a selected commit; source timestamps, coverage and stale states remain visible. Source refreshes download public catalogs without sending entered addresses to publishers. Dataset notices accompany these sources; credentials, ports and GeoLite2 fields from upstream proxy records are not retained.

The IP reputation check uses two additional IP data sources: CINS Army and Emerging Threats Compromised IPs. The former permits use of its public file; the latter has a publisher GPL version 2 licensing clarification. Dataset notices link the original files and terms. These sources are independently cached without transmitting lookup addresses to publishers. File modification dates describe the source files, not individual incidents.

Interpreting providers and source evidence

Why do different IP data sources disagree?

A registry, resolver, routing collector and location database describe different objects and can update on different schedules. First compare the same field for the same address and time. Agreement alone does not establish physical ground truth, and a disagreement is not automatically evidence that one provider returned a faulty response.

Does a provider name prove where a device is located?

No. A registered organization identifies an administrative record, while an observed gateway may serve users elsewhere. Approximate location fields have their own method and coverage. Source attribution lets you distinguish those meanings. It should remain attached to a report rather than becoming an unsupported identity or exact-location claim.

Which providers can see the input I submit?

That depends on the operation. Browser endpoints receive their requests, server-side DNS and registry queries transmit the selected question, and public remote measurements have their own visibility rules. Local calculations use no live lookup provider. Read the specific section here and the operation description before submitting confidential names or targets.

Why are local models and standards listed beside live providers?

They explain how an output was derived even when no live query occurs. Address definitions support range classification; numbering metadata supports telephone parsing; a dictionary model supports password-pattern estimation. These are distinct from current subscriber, carrier or breach records. Provider documentation and version notices clarify what the underlying material can actually establish.

Why does the interface leave some fields unavailable?

The upstream service may omit a value, restrict access or fail to respond. The application does not turn a registered country into an estimated city or replace an absent observation with a sample. IP data sources need relevant evidence for each field. Preserve the missing state and associated error when asking for help.

Does clearing a result delete the provider request?

Clearing the interface removes its displayed copy; it does not reverse requests already processed elsewhere. Some remote measurements and targets are public at the provider. Other services have their own logging and retention policies. Follow provider documentation and the tool-specific disclosure when deciding whether a proposed test is suitable for sensitive information.

What do source dates mean in proxy and reputation checks?

A catalog timestamp describes the downloaded source or its publication state, rather than the date of an individual event. Listed ranges, observed exits and threat-list entries represent different evidence. Source attribution preserves those distinctions, including stale or incomplete states. An absent match does not demonstrate universal safety or establish how an address is currently used.

How do I report an inaccurate location estimate?

Identify the service and field that produced the estimate, preserve the address and observation time, then follow that supplier’s correction process. A correction sent to an unrelated registry may not affect the database a website uses. Share only the evidence needed for the review and verify the same field after any reported update.

Prepare a location correction

Review measurement interpretation