WebRTC leak test

See the addresses this browser exposes through WebRTC and compare public candidates with fresh HTTP observations. A difference needs investigation; this is not a VPN safety certificate.

No camera or microphone permission is requested. Candidate details stay in this tab unless you copy them; the test does not upload them to our server. Clear results before sharing your screen.

How the test works

When you run this WebRTC leak test, your browser contacts Cloudflare STUN and ipify HTTP endpoints. Those providers receive the source address used to reach them.

WebRTC leak test has not run. Start when your network and VPN are ready.

How the test works

Your browser checks HTTPS and STUN independently, then compares public addresses from the same IP family.
Your browser
HTTPS path

ipify reports the address seen over HTTPS.

STUN path

Cloudflare STUN discovers WebRTC candidates.

Compare the same IP family

No candidates? The result stays inconclusive. A browser setting, extension or network may prevent this collection.

On this page

Learn more about WebRTC leak test

Run a WebRTC leak test

This WebRTC leak test answers a specific question: did a readable public address candidate differ from this browser’s HTTP reference address? The summary gives the finding, its meaning and a next step. Read the individual observations before deciding whether a difference violates your intended VPN or proxy configuration.

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Connect to the network you want to inspect, then select Run WebRTC leak test. Keep Wi-Fi, VPN settings and the selected server unchanged during collection. Switching connections halfway through can mix observations from different routes and times. Allow up to twelve seconds; Stop ends collection and preserves any observations already received as incomplete evidence.

WebRTC candidate gathering contacts Cloudflare’s public STUN endpoint and separate ipify HTTP endpoints for IPv4 and IPv6. Those providers receive the source address of each request. No camera or microphone permission is needed. The tool creates no call with another person and does not upload the candidate report to our application server. A service’s own request processing is separate from the report kept in this tab.

Start with the result summary, then inspect the HTTP reference cards and candidate details. Copying is optional and includes observed addresses. Review the report before sharing it, particularly local addresses. Clear removes the displayed observations and stops an active run; it does not remove a report you already copied to another application.

Understand the three possible findings

Different public address observed means a readable, non-relay public candidate or public related address differed from an available HTTP reference of the same address family. This is a reason to investigate routing. It does not identify an address as your residential ISP or prove that your VPN failed. Another interface, an expected exit or an intentional split-tunnel policy can explain a difference.

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No difference observed means candidate gathering completed without a reported STUN error and all compared public observations matched their references. The conclusion covers the available candidates and these endpoints in this run. It cannot certify DNS routing, applications outside the browser or protection after a future network change.

Inconclusive means the evidence does not support either conclusion. Examples include a missing same-family reference, no readable public candidate, an unfinished collection or an error affecting the run. A blank list is never treated as a privacy pass. Execution status describes collection; the business conclusion describes what can be inferred from its observations.

IPv4 and IPv6 are compared separately. An IPv4 value and an IPv6 value are different representations of different address families; comparing their strings would produce a meaningless warning. If the IPv6 reference fails, an IPv6 candidate remains uncomparable. A valid IPv4 observation is retained rather than discarded because another request failed.

What the candidate details describe

A host candidate describes an interface made visible by the browser. A server-reflexive, or srflx, candidate describes an address learned through STUN. The parser also distinguishes peer-reflexive and relay candidates. This test configures STUN rather than a TURN relay or a remote peer; a relay address is excluded from the unexpected-address comparison because it belongs to a relay service.

Some browsers substitute an mDNS name ending in .local for an interface’s literal address. That is a concealed address observation, not an IP we can compare. The tool does not resolve the name or guess a hidden value. A private address such as 192.168.1.20 describes a local network context and is different from a public internet exit.

Candidate rows identify type, transport, scope and any readable related address. Unspecified placeholders such as 0.0.0.0 or :: are not presented as discovered addresses. The saved report omits the complete session description and temporary connection credentials. These choices keep the details useful without implying that every browser-reported field describes a unique person or device.

Investigate differences and incomplete runs

Repeat the test without changing connections. Check whether the same difference recurs and whether both values belong to the same family. Note the browser, selected VPN location, time and intended policy. A repeatable observation with an expected address is more useful to support than a screenshot labelled “leak” without context.

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Review the protection you actually configured. A browser extension, system VPN and application-specific proxy can cover different traffic. A split-tunnel exclusion may be deliberate. Verify the expected exit with your provider and, when helpful, inspect registration or routing information through IP lookup and ASN lookup. A database country difference alone does not establish unwanted exposure.

A timeout means collection did not report completion within our limit. It does not prove that WebRTC is disabled or that protection worked. An ICE error concerns an attempted endpoint or path; another attempt may still produce a candidate. Preserve the error and any successful observations together. If the peer-connection API is unavailable, use a supported browser and rerun rather than interpreting the unavailable state as a match.

This page does not observe your recursive DNS resolver or test every application on the device. Use DNS leak testing for resolver observations when its service is available, and IPv6 testing for protocol-specific HTTP evidence. Neither result replaces a documented routing policy. Our browser privacy test matrix provides dated examples of why gathering state and privacy conclusions need separate interpretation.

WebRTC leak test questions

Does a matching WebRTC leak test mean my VPN is secure?

No. It means the public candidates that could be compared matched their HTTP references in this run. DNS, other applications, future transitions and provider practices need separate evidence. Keep the observation’s scope attached to any report.

Why does another browser show different results?

Browser privacy policies, extensions and network configurations can expose different candidate sets. Test each browser you use. A result from one browser should not be applied to another, especially when only one has a VPN extension or managed policy.

Does this tool remember my address history?

The candidate report stays in the current page state. Clearing removes that display; leaving ends collection. Explicit copying puts the report on your clipboard. Cloudflare and ipify independently process endpoint requests, so local report handling does not describe their retention policies.

Can I run the test without JavaScript?

The explanation remains readable, but collection requires browser JavaScript and the peer-connection API. Unavailability is shown explicitly. The homepage can provide a separate ordinary HTTP address observation; that is a different measurement.

Check my public IP address

Is a .local candidate a leaked public IP address?

A browser can use an mDNS name to conceal a local candidate. That name is different from a readable public address. This page does not resolve it or treat the identifier alone as proof that a public route bypassed your VPN.

Does an empty WebRTC leak test prove that WebRTC is blocked?

No. Browser policy, gathering behavior, network conditions or a failed STUN exchange can leave no readable candidate. Inspect the collection state and coverage. Missing evidence is not the same as a verified protection setting.

How do I compare WebRTC candidates with HTTP addresses?

IPv4 and IPv6 values describe different address spaces. A difference between those families is not a meaningful equality test. Compare a readable public candidate with an available HTTP reference from the same family, keeping missing references explicit.

Can changing networks affect WebRTC candidate gathering?

Yes. Candidates and HTTP references can be observed at different points during collection. Switching networks or VPN servers can mix states. Repeat under a stable configuration before concluding that a specific route violates your intended policy.